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From the Offshore World of International Finance to Your




The series LLC is a business structure with the potential to usher in
innovative solutions for risk structuring, asset protection, business
reorganization, and organic business growth. Yet, because it was
originally developed for use by "heavy-weight" members of the cor-
porate and financial services industry, and because only a handful of
states have adopted it by statute, many questions about the feasibil-
ity of series LLCs for small or medium-sized companies remain un-
answered. Some authors have promoted the series LLC as a
promising vehicle for a diverse range of small businesses. This arti-
cle takes a more cautious approach, exploring structural and mem-
bership issues in light of tax and bankruptcy law, forewarning
potential pitfalls with industry-specific examples, providing solu-
tions for potential obstacles, and suggesting additional legal devel-
opments that could heighten the series LLC's performance as an
advantaged vehicle for investment and innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have witnessed an explosion of new business struc-
tures domestically and abroad. In the U.S., "[m]ost states have gone
from a statutory regime [with] four prevalent business models ... to
one [with] at least two ... and as many as five new choices in some
jurisdictions."' This expansion in the U.S. has been driven, in part, by
competition from offshore financial centers that have attracted global
* Attorney at Law, The Blake Law Firm, PLLC, Austin, Texas. The author would like to
thank Arnold Tan of Rajah & Tann, LLP in Singapore, for imparting his ample knowledge in the
area of structured vehicles and international investment funds, and for the opportunity to study
and work with protected cell company law under his direction.
1. Carol R. Goforth, The Series LLC, and a Series of Difficult Questions, 60 ARK. L. REv. 385,
385 (2007). Vermont's virtual company is the latest entity to be developed. It operates "without
a physical headquarters, [with no] actual paper filings, and [with] directors' meetings [conducted
online]. If it succeeds, it could emerge with the nation's first virtual tech corridor." Alan Rappe-
port, Vermont Wants to Be the "Delaware of the Net", CFO.coM (June 30, 2008), http://www.cfo.
com/article.cfm/11654091/c_2984311/?f=archives.
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business and investment through favorable tax environments and in-
novative company structures. 2
The protected cell company is an offshore innovation now planted
in U.S. soil. Known in some jurisdictions as "segregated accounts
companies" or "segregated portfolio companies," 3 this entity consists
of related "cell" companies, generally arranged as a core cell and any
number of sub-cells. Each cell is only responsible for its own assets
and liabilities, and even the core cell can be insulated from the liabili-
ties and insolvency of sub-cells.4
In the U.S., a number of states have introduced two general varia-
tions of this structure: the protected cell insurance company,5 and the
series LLC. As the name implies, the protected cell insurance com-
pany structure is generally limited to serving the insurance industry,6
2. See Andrew Morriss, The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition 18-
19 (U. Ill. C.L.L. & Econ. Working Paper Series., Paper No. LE07-032, 2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract id=1275390 (last visited Nov. 28, 2010):
Jurisdictions compete by offering transactions-cost reducing legal innovations ....
'[Olne of the marking features of the financial era that begins in the 1980s is its drive to
produce innovations.' The rapid spread of the limited liability company (LLC) business
entity within the United States after Wyoming passed the first LLC statute in 1977 is an
example of such competition .... [T]he spread of international business corporations
(IBCs) and segregated cell insurance entities internationally also illustrate this
phenomenon.
(citing SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY 76 (2d ed. 2001)). Not only are legislators an active
part of competition and innovation in financial centers - courts are, too. See Timothy P. Glynn,
Delaware's Vantagepoint: The Empire Strikes Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 91, 94 (2008) ("VantagePoint ... removes any doubt that the Delaware Supreme Court
structures its decisions to further Delaware's chartering market interests, [and] exposes Dela-
ware's new strategies for furthering those interests. I contend that this decision, in this small but
dominant state, is designed to do no less than chart the future course of American (and perhaps
global) business entity law.").
3. Andrew Weaver, Valerie Georges-Thomas & Malcolm Moller, Segregated Cell Companies:
A Cross Jurisdictional Review 1 (2007), http://www.applebyglobal.com/uploaded/Publication/847
_File_5.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Rating Protected Cell Companies, A.M. BEST METHODOLOGY 4 (Mar. 4, 2008), http://www.
ambest.com/ratings/methodology/ProtectedCellCaptives.pdf; see also Gordon A. Schaller &
Scott A. Harshman, Use of Captive Insurance Companies in Estate Planning, 33 ACTEC J. 252,
253 (2008) (indicating that the following states are among those that have modem captive insur-
ance statutes: Utah, Nevada, Montana, Kentucky, Arizona, Vermont, Delaware, District of Co-
lumbia, and Hawaii).
6. See Willis Global Captive Practice, Protected Cell Companies: The Present & Future (May
2008), http://www.wilcor.com/documents/publications/Services/Captives/Protected-Cell-Compa-
nies_(PCCs)-_The.present andFuture.pdf; NIGEL FEETHAM & GRANT JONES, PROTECTED
CELL COMPANIES: A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION & USE (2008). The U.S. NAIC Protected Ceti
Company Model Act is specifically designed to encourage domestic insurance securitization. See
Peter Carayannopoulos, Paul Kovacs & Darrell Leadbetter, Inurance Securitization: Cata-
strophic Event Exposure and the Role of Insurance Linked Securities in Addressing Risk, INST.
FOR CATASTROPHIC LOSS REDUCTION 1, 9 (2003), http://www.iclr.org/images/Insurance-Securi-
tization.pdf.
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parallel to its original purpose in offshore jurisdictions. 7 The series
LLC, however, has been adopted and
promoted in a number of states for a broad (or unlimited) range of
business activities, and it is probably used most frequently in real
estate.8
Because the protected cell structure was originally developed for
use by "heavy-weight" members of the corporate and financial ser-
vices industry, many questions about the feasibility of series LLCs for
small or medium-sized companies remain open. Some commentators
promote it as a promising vehicle for diverse business purposes, even
for small businesses such as "farms, restaurants, [] software [firms,]
and bio-tech start-ups," 9 among others. This article takes a more cau-
tious approach, exploring the series LLC structure and membership
issues in light of federal income tax and bankruptcy law, forewarning
potential pitfalls with industry-specific examples, and suggesting solu-
tions to overcome potential obstacles.
Part II explores the offshore development of protected cell struc-
tures, the emergence of the series LLC, and the series LLC's promise
as a flexible and efficient business vehicle. Part III discusses series
LLCs as business entities and describes the tax consequences that flow
from the structure of series LLCs and from the composition of mem-
bers' interests. Part IV explores bankruptcy issues that create unique
challenges for series LLCs, including substantive consolidation and
the downside risk that a series entity may face if classified as a single
asset real estate company ("SARE"). Part IV goes on to explore
structural solutions for series LLCs and SARE-resistant mechanisms.
Part V concludes that the series LLC is generally not an appropriate
structure for small and medium-sized businesses operated by rela-
tively unsophisticated business people (be they farmers or bio-molec-
ular engineers). Many hidden challenges await small businesses
attempting to segregate operations and assets through the series LLC
structure. Yet, larger scale companies may successfully implement the
series LLC to potentiate innovative solutions for risk structuring, asset
protection, business reorganization, and organic business growth.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 10-32.
8. Howard J. Levine, Letter to IRS re IRS National Office Project on Delaware Series Limited
Liability Company, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, CREATIVE TAX PLANNING FOR REAL Es-
TATE TRANSACTIONS 453, 456 (2008) ("Over the years, we have most often encountered [the
series LLC] where partners form a partnership to acquire and develop real estate properties...
[and] to separately limit liability with respect to each property development ....").
9. Dominick T. Gattuso, Series LLCs: Let's Give the Frog a Little Love, Bus. L. TODAY, July-
Aug. 2008, at 35, 35-36.
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II. BACKGROUND ON PROTECTED CELL COMPANIES
AND THE SERIES LLC
From its emergence in the 1960s, the protected cell company has
spread across the globe, adapting new characteristics in various juris-
dictions. This structure has been "ideal for.., captive insurance com-
panies, multiple tranche debt issue vehicles, securitisation and
derivative transactions." 10 It has also been used extensively in the
Cayman Islands for hedge funds1 and in other jurisdictions for mu-
tual funds.12 With the emergence of the series LLC in the U.S., the
protected cell structure became available for an unlimited range of
uses, and this entity shows promising advantages for companies that
can effectively harness its flexibility and efficiency.
A. The Evolution of the Protected Cell Company
and the Series LLC
The protected cell company initially evolved as an innovative busi-
ness vehicle serving the offshore captive and "rent-a-captive" insur-
ance industry. 13 "[C]aptives are insurance companies that are owned
by their policyholders,"' 14 and are designed to achieve tax advan-
tages15 and other strategic goals by self-insuring some risks while
purchasing cheaper and more flexible coverage for other risks on the
secondary insurance market. 16 Bermuda became the birthplace of the
first captive insurance company in the 1960s, 17 and by the late 1970s, a
10. See Weaver et al., supra note 3, at 2.
11. HEDGE FUND & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 62 (Israel Nelken ed., 2006).
12. Jacob Stein, Advanced Asset Protection & Tax Planning with LLCs, L.A. LAW., June 2006,
at text preceding n.25.
13. See Rating Protected Cell Companies, supra note 5, at 3.
14. John A. Wright, The Pluses & Minuses of Captives, NURSING HOMES: LONG TERM CARE
MANAGEMENT, Aug. 2002, at 34, 39.
15. See Schaller & Harshman, supra note 5, at 258 ("In general, the Internal Revenue Code
permits property and casualty insurance companies certain deductions against taxable income,
including premium income and investment income, that are not available to regular corpora-
tions. These deductions may significantly reduce, if not eliminate, an insurance company's taxa-
ble income from premiums received or investment income earned in a given year.").
16. Roger Gillett & Robert Davis, Rent-a-Captives: Why Own When You Can Rent?, JOHN
LINER REV., Winter 2005, at 1-2 ("Organizations may establish captives to obtain coverage that
is unavailable in the traditional marketplace. More often, however, a company establishes a
captive with the goal of crafting customized insurance contracts while lowering its insurance
costs. Lower costs accrue, in part, through underwriting profit and investment income on pre-
mium cash flow and claims reserves. The use of a captive also allows a company with a good loss
history to pay premiums that reflect its own cxperience rather than the risk profile of its
industry.").
17. See Elizabeth R. Costle & Kathleen A. Shauer, The Captive Alternative: A Regulatory
Perspective, 19 J. INS. REG. 304, 306 (2000).
[Vol. 9:1
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derivative model emerged: "rent-a-captives."'1 8 The rent-a-captive
model allows smaller, "unrelated companies [to] pay a fee to 'lease'
capital, surplus, and an insurance license from a captive sponsor ....
[The Captive sponsor] separate[s] the assets and liabilities of each
renter - or cell - from those of the other renters ...."19
Early rent-a-captives segregated renters' assets and liabilities within
the company solely through contract. 20 Statutory recognition of the
protected cell structure emerged in Bermuda in the early 1990s under
140 private legislative acts that only granted specific companies the
right to organize segregated portfolio companies.2' Today, Bermuda
remains the "[t]he largest venue for captives[,] ' 22 but in 1997 Guern-
sey23 became the first offshore jurisdiction to pass public legislation 24
offering the protected cell company structure.25 Today Guernsey
domiciles the largest number of protected cell companies in Europe.26
As offshore financial centers captured market share in the captive
and rent-a-captive insurance industry, U.S. jurisdictions were simulta-
neously stepping up efforts to compete. "Vermont aggressively sought
captive [insurance] business starting in 1979," offering "low initial cap-
ital requirements, an annual audit, and a hefty dose of self-regula-
tion. '"27 Delaware also initiated captive-enabling legislation in the
1980s with the specific intent of luring Bermuda-based insurance com-
panies, but "[d]espite the progressive nature of Delaware's captive
18. See Rating Protected Cell Companies, supra note 5, at 3.
19. See Gillett & Davis, supra note 16, at 1.
20. Cf! Rating Protected Cell Companies, supra note 5, at 3.
21. John J. O'Brien, Insuring On Shore Risk Through Segregated Cells - Will Our Firewalls
Hold Up?, 1 (2006), http://www.captiveguru.com/mfcms/files/Segregated%20Cells%20-%20Dis-
cussion.pdf.
22. Schaller & Harshman, supra note 5, at 254 ("Other Caribbean captive jurisdictions include
the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and Barbados.").
23. Ogier Client Briefing, Joint Ownership and Ownership in Common of Guernsey Real
Property, 1 (Apr. 2006), http://www.ogier.com/Publication%20Library/GuernseyjointOwner
ship.pdf ("Guernsey is a self-governing dependency of the British Crown and does not form part
of the United Kingdom. By constitutional convention established over some 900 years the Is-
land has complete autonomy in all matters of internal government, including taxation.").
24. Weaver et al., supra note 3.
25. See O'Brien, supra note 21 ("Bermuda passed the Segregated Accounts Companies (SAC)
Act in 2000 but before that, many companies operated in Bermuda as rent a captives without the
benefit of statutory separation of accounts.").
26. Stephen Ainsworth & Ian Morris, Captives & Protected Cells Companies for Employee
Benefits: a European View, BENEFITS & COMPENSATION INT'L, June 2008, at 1, 4, available at
http://www.bw-ci.com/publications[EB/captives-and-protected-cell-11-01-08.pdf.
27. See Morriss, supra note 2, at 57.
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statute, even as amended in 1988 and 1995, captive insurers did not
flock to Delaware." 28
To be globally competitive, U.S. financial centers needed to
"sweeten the deal" with protected cell structures like those offered
offshore. Delaware led the way in 1996 when it passed the first legis-
lation to recognize the series LLC - a limited liability company that
can issue an unlimited number of sub-series entities.29 Like the pro-
tected cell company structure, the series LLC is designed such that the
"debts, liabilities, and obligations relating to one series are enforcea-
ble only against the assets of that series and not against the assets of
the LLC generally or the assets of any other series. '30
For its time, this was a tremendously progressive statute because it
was the first public legislation to offer the protected cell structure for
all business purposes - not just for insurance or the finance industry.
A number of other states, including Iowa, Illinois, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, and Utah subsequently developed series LLC statutes. 31
As will be discussed in Part III, Illinois series LLC legislation provides
a number of advantages over the Delaware model, and may be a use-
ful touchstone for series LLC best practices. 32
B. The Series LLC as a Flexible and Efficient Business Vehicle
In addition to the risk protection that can be achieved through seg-
regating assets in separate series entities, the series LLC offers a host
of other benefits. The most widely recognized utility is its documen-
tary efficiency: "[b]usiness objectives that [previously] required the
creation of multiple documents and multiple LLCs may now be
achieved with the creation of only one document, which will generally
be significantly less expensive for the client. '33 These savings are fur-
ther compounded by "reduce[ed] legal, accounting and administrative
28. Michael W. Teichman, DELAWARE'S NEW CAPTIVE INSURANCE STATUTE, FED. REG.
CouNs. J., Mar. 2007, at 6, available at http://www.forc.org/public/articles/12?highlight=protected
+cell.
29. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (1996).
30. Michael E. Mooney, Series LLC's: The Loaves and Fishes of Subchapter K, 116 TAX
NOTES 663, 664 (2007).
31. Jared L. Peterson, Unlimited Potential or Uncertain Future: Series LLCs & Intra-Family
Wealth Transfers, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 385, 388-89 (2007).
32. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
33. Helen Gunnarsson, Are Series LLCs Right for Your Clients?, 93 ILL. B.J. 562, 562 (2005).
Some commentators arguc that this is the only guaranteed benefit of the structure. See Nick
Marsico, Current Status of the Series LLC: Illinois Series LLC Improves Upon Delaware Series
LLC But Many Open Issues Remain, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTrrLEs, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 35, 51 ("The
only definitive advantage of a series LLC [is lower filing fees] .... ).
[Vol. 9:1
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fees in certain circumstances. ' 34 One author calculates that start-up
and accounting costs for establishing and operating ten Delaware
LLCs may be around $20,000 more expensive than forming a Dela-
ware Series LLC with ten sub-series entities.35 This is likely to be a
conservative estimate for some kinds of businesses, considering that it
does not include specialized regulatory or registration costs that some
businesses would otherwise incur for each entity.
The series LLC also offers interesting possibilities for like-kind
swaps36 and generally allows for efficient transfers of property. For
example, transferring an undivided interest in real property is much
more difficult than transferring an LLC interest, "a relatively simple
process ... governed by statute in the absence of contrary provisions
in the LLC's operating agreement." 37 Transferring a sub-series, rather
than the real property itself, enables a company to avoid "the associ-
ated real estate closing costs," including "transfer tax costs, recording
multiple deeds and the related cost, [and] title issues."38 Of course,
these kinds of transfers are already available with ordinary LLCs.
However, the series LLC offers an added bonus: "tax-free transfers
within the LLC.''39 A series LLC can create new series entities at any
time, and may achieve some of the effects of a sale without necessarily
creating a taxed transaction, even where the property is not "like
kind."'40 Too aggressive of an approach, however, may still result in
taxable transactions.41
34. Julia Gold, Series Limited Liability Companies - Too Good to Be True?, NEV. LAW., July
2004, at 18, 20.
35. Nathaniel V. Thompkins, At Glacier Speed, the Fastest Growing Entity of Choice, the Se-
ries LLC?, 4 (2006), http://nm-ny-pa-law.net/AtGlacierSpeed.pdf. Note, however, that since
the time that Thompkins' article was published, California has determined that it will recognize
series entities as separate LLCs for the purpose of state franchise tax, diminishing some of the
potential savings mentioned in the article. See Dibby Allan Green, Delaware Series LLC or LP:
California's Recognition & Tax Reporting (2008), http://www.taxlawsb.com/resources/BusTax/Se-
riesLLC.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
36. See generally Louis S. Weller, Selected Like-Kind Exchange Issues, in PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 883, 939-40 (2003),
available at 562 PLI/Tax 883 (Westlaw). A like-kind swap is a transaction whereby two or more
parties exchange property of similar kind and do not incur tax liability because the similarity of
the property traded is determined to produce no accession to wealth or profit. See I.R.C. § 1031
(2006).
37. Peterson, supra note 31, at 394 (citing Ann Berger Lesk & Claudio A. De Vellis, Estate
Planning With Real Estate Assets, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLAN-
NING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 541, 549 (2004), available at 603 PLI/Tax 541 (Westlaw).
38. See Lesk & De Vellis, supra note 37, at 549.
39. See Gold, supra note 34, at 20.
40. Christopher M. Riser, Delaware Series LLC (updated 2006), http://www.riserlaw.com/pub-
lications/business/seriesllc.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
41. See Terence Floyd Cuff, Series LLCs & The Abolition of the Tax System, in TAX PLAN-
NING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCs, JoINTr VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC
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If the reduced start-up costs, reduced transaction costs, and reduced
taxes are not enough to ensure a company's success, the series LLC
structure still has a few benefits to offer. Whereas an insolvent LLC
"would not be allowed to make a distribution under the Delaware
LLC Act, a distribution can be made from a [sub-]series to the extent
that the fair value of series' assets exceeds its liabilities. '42 In other
words, if a master LLC and nine out of ten of its series entities are
unprofitable, the profitable series may still make distributions. Simi-
larly, the insolvency of one series does not affect any other series,
making it a potentially useful asset protection tool, assuming that
courts in non-series LLC jurisdictions will respect the series as a sepa-
rate entity.43 Part III explores the corporate personality of series
LLCs and their status as a tax entities vis-A-vis permutations of series
LLC structures and the terms governing members' interests.
III. UNVEILING THE PARADOX OF SERIES LLCs
The paradox of the series LLC is that it attempts to be both singular
and multiple - ideally a single entity for registration, regulation, and
taxes,44 yet multiple entities for business and asset protection pur-
poses. Originally, the legal status of series entities was unclear, but
recent developments have illuminated the issue. Similarly, series enti-
ties' status as tax entities has been much conjectured, yet there is now
a reasonable amount of certainty about how the IRS will classify sin-
gle and multi-member series LLC entities. Even so, individual states
may still develop different classification and tax schemes. Additional
developments in tax law could improve the series LLC's performance
as an advantaged vehicle for investment and innovation, particularly
by allowing multi-member series entities to be disregarded according
to safe harbor provisions that adequately account for enterprise value,
commonality of ownership, and other considerations.
A. Series LLCs as Business Entities
Originally, series entities in Delaware did not enjoy the full rights
and powers that typical business entities possess. Without legislation
specifically enabling series entities to enter transactions in their own
name, they could not "borrow money, maintain bank accounts, enter
ALLIANCES 339, 350-53 (2008), available at 813 PLIJTax 339 (Westlaw) (providing fact patterns
for potentially abusive series LLC transactions in examples six through nine).
42. See Goforth, supra note 1, at 387.
43. See infra notes 94-153 and accompanying text.
44. This is a generalization. A series LLC organized as an open-end investment company may
desire for each series entity to be a separate tax partnership.
[Vol. 9:1
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into legally binding contracts, [and could not] sue or be sued."'45 The
statute did not give series entities a right to own property, but instead
provided for "segregating assets and liabilities (and management)
within the LLC. ' '46 In 2007, a Delaware court confirmed the non-en-
tity status of series entities, stating, "I do not find that Series B was an
entity at all, but merely a 'series interest' of GxG Management LLC
... GxG Management is the appropriate party to pursue the claims
raised in this case, both tort and contract. '47 Thus, in the early devel-
opment of series LLC law in Delaware, the master LLC alone had the
right to enter transactions on behalf of series entities. It would also
have the right, but not the duty (unless established by contract), to sue
on behalf of series entities.
Illinois took a different approach. The Illinois series LLC statute
provided more flexibility, enabling a series to be "treated as a sepa-
rate entity to the extent set forth in the articles of organization, ' 48 and
specifically stating that "[e]ach series with limited liability may, in its
own name, contract, hold title to assets, grant security interests, sue
and be sued and otherwise conduct business and exercise the powers
of a limited liability company. ' 49 This was an important development
that appeared to give Illinois series LLCs an advantage over their Del-
aware cousins, who were still treated as second-class citizens.
Delaware did not follow in line with Illinois until after the court in
GxG Management held that a series was a non-entity. 50 The subse-
quent amendments allow series entities to contract for and hold title
to real, personal, and intangible property.51 Additionally, the law is
flexible regarding how a series may hold assets: "directly or indirectly,
including in the name of such series, in the name of the limited liabil-
ity company, through a nominee or otherwise. '52 A series may also
45. Craig A. Gerson, Taxing Series LLCs, 45 TAx McGMr. MEMORANDUM 75, text preceding
note 12 (2004).
46. John C. Murray, A Real Estate Practitioner's Guide to Series LLCs, 8 (2007) (citing DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §18-215(a), which provides that separate series may be established with re-
spect to "specified property or obligations of the limited liability company."), available at http://
title.firstam.com/assets/title/uploads/asset-upload-file631-10063.pdf.
47. GxG Mgmt., LLC v. Young Bros. and Co., Inc., No. 05-162-B-K, 2007 WL 1702872, at *2
(D. Me. June 11, 2007).
48. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/37-40(b) (2005). It also authorizes "consolid[ation]" of the
operations of several series "to the extent permitted under applicable law," and provides that
two or more series may elect to contract jointly or elect to be treated as a single business for
qualification purposes to do business in Illinois or any other state without affecting the limita-
tions of liability set forth in the statute. Id.
49. Id. See also Goforth, supra note 1, at 388-89.
50. See GxG Mgmt., 2007 WL 1702872, at *2.
51. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(c) (2007).
52. tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
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sue and be sued in its own name, and may grant liens and security
interests.5 3 To a large extent, the amendments to the Delaware statute
eliminated the differences between series LLCs in Delaware and
Illinois.
The Illinois series LLC statute is still distinguishable from its Dela-
ware counterpart, however, because Illinois imposes additional provi-
sions on the name, registration, and termination of series entities.
Illinois raised the bar by requiring that "[t]he name of the series ...
must contain the entire name of the limited liability company and be
distinguishable from the names of the other series set forth in the arti-
cles of organization. '54 Illinois also requires series LLCs to file sepa-
rate "certificates of designation" 55 to create and terminate any series,
arguably providing better notice to the public about the identity of the
series.56 As will be discussed in Part IV, Illinois' additional filing and
notice requirements may provide advantages to series LLCs in bank-
ruptcy, fortifying the liability shields between the series LLC entities
against equitable consolidation or other "veil-piercing" actions. 57
In Delaware, by contrast, a master LLC files a "certificate of forma-
tion" that contains a limited liability notice of the master LLC and its
series.58 Thereafter, the LLC may create or terminate an unlimited
number of series entities without any state filing because there is "no
requirement that any specific series of the limited liability company be
referenced in such notice. '59 While the lack of name and registration
requirements and expenses are certainly a benefit, all series LLCs
would be wise to consider the spirit and insolvency-planning advan-
tages of the Illinois provisions, taking extra care to provide notice to
third parties and to distinguish the names of various entities.
B. Structuring Series LLCs for Flow-Through Taxation
The majority of series LLC literature expresses uneasiness about
the uncertainty of series LLC tax treatment. 60 One commentator
states, "[t]here is virtually no authority on the issue of whether [multi-
member series entities owned in the majority by a common set of
members] would be treated for tax purposes as separate partner-
53. tit. 6, § 18-215(c).
54. 805 I11. Comp. Stat. 180/37-40(c) (2007).
55. 180/37-40(d).
56. See Murray, supra note 46, at 10.
57. See text following note 114.
58. DEL. CODE. AN-N. tit. 6, § 18-215(b) (2007)-
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., CCH Staff, Eds., GUIDE TO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 87 (CCH Tax &
Accounting, 2005).
[Vol. 9:1
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ships."'61 Yet the IRS recently provided some guidance with Private
Letter Ruling 20-08-030-04, dispelling much uncertainty.62 One sur-
vey of accountants indicated that some series LLCs are reporting as a
single entity while others are reporting the master LLC and series en-
tities as separate tax entities.63 Without more information, this anec-
dote is of little use, because a company's status as a series entity under
state law does not determine whether a series is a taxable entity.64
Instead, the underlying economic arrangement, as embodied in the
structure of the series LLC and the members' respective interests is the
critical question. 65
Limited liability companies are generally utilized as "flow-through"
tax entities, meaning that profits and losses are passed directly to the
members and are not taxed at the entity level.66 But series LLCs or
series entities may elect one of three tax elections, depending on their
membership structure. Although the "Check the Box Regulations" 67
permit a non-corporate business entity to file as a corporation, many
companies organized as an LLC wish to avoid the "double taxation"
associated with the corporate form. Alternatively, an entity with two
or more members may choose the default partnership election. 68 An
entity with a single "owner" 69 (such as a single-member series) may be
taxed as a corporation or may be disregarded as an entity that does
not report separately from its owner.70
Tension between series LLCs and Check the Box Regulations
emerges where the master LLC wishes to issue multi-member series
entities (perhaps to raise capital), but the master LLC also wants to
enjoy the tax benefits of a disregarded entity. Under a plain reading
61. See Levine, supra note 8, at 457.
62. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 20-08-030-04 (Jan. 18, 2008).
63. See Green, supra note 35.
64. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2009) ("Whether an organization is an
entity separate from its owners for federal tax purposes is a matter of federal tax law and does
not depend on whether the organization is recognized as an entity under local law.").
65. CCH TAX LAW, Top MULTISTATE TAX ISSUES FOR 2008 CPE COURSE § 3.19 (2007); Craig
A. Gerson, Taxing Series LLCs, 45 TAX MoGr. MEMORANDUM 75, 80 (2004) (citing Treas. Reg.
§ 301-7701-1); 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
66. LLCs and partnerships both receive flow through tax treatment.
67. See Treas. Dept., I.R.S. Form 8832, Entity Classification Election (2010), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf.
68. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2006).
69. Strictly speaking, members are not owners of an LLC, but instead have membership inter-
ests in the LLC. In the context of Check the Box Regulations, however, a member is nominally
classified as an owner. See Treas. Dept., IRS Form 8832, Entity Classification Election (2010)
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf.
70. Cf., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1)(4) (as amended in 2009), with Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
3(b)(1)(4) (as amended in 2006).
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of the Check the Box Regulations, a business entity with two or more
owners is not disregarded, but may elect partnership taxation. 71 Such
an election eliminates the master LLC's ability to offset profits and
losses among series entities because they will be separate tax partner-
ships, not disregarded entities. Further, the series entities, as separate
tax entities, may encounter other tax disadvantages if they later desire
to merge.
Most commentators and practitioners appear to agree that multi-
member series entities with little common ownership should be
treated as separate tax entities. 72 Supporting this position, some anal-
ogize the issue to developments in Delaware and Massachusetts busi-
ness trusts: "[A]s early as 1949, the Tax Court held that each series of
a Delaware statutory trust may be regarded as a separate taxpayer," 73
and the IRS took this position in relation to a Massachusetts business
trust in 1984. 74 Since that time, the IRS has taken a similar position in
a number of private letter rulings. 75
Yet, in an open letter addressed to the IRS, Levine argues that
multi-member series LLC entities should be disregarded for tax pur-
poses where there is a "very high level of common ownership, [an]
overall common business purpose... [and] all the partners hold them-
selves out as partners in a single partnership. '76 He claims that this
would "accomplish[ ] the same business objectives" that are currently
achieved using an ordinary LLC as a holding company for subsidiary
LLCs, with the difference being that series LLCs could save costs via
the series LLC's efficiency in documentation and administration. 77
What Levine fails to emphasize is that a loose policy that liberally dis-
regards multi-member series entities could enable additional business
objectives and may fundamentally change a company's operational
and investment strategy.78
71. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2006). The same interpretation was as-
serted recently in a private letter ruling. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 20-08-030-04 (Jan. 18, 2008).
72. See Levine, supra note 8, at 457 (citing Gerson, supra note 45). See also Cuff, supra note
41.
73. See Mooney, supra note 30, at text accompanying note 79 (citing Nat'l Sec. Series - Indus.
Stocks Series v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 884 (1949)).
74. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,211, 1984 WL 264943 (Jan. 13, 1984).
75. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-47-013 (Aug. 20, 1998).
76. See Levine, supra note 8, at 458 (citing Thomas M. Stephens & Marc L. Schulz, Segregat-
ing Assets Within a Single Partnership, TAXES, Mar. 2000, at 231, 239).
77. See Levine, supra note 8, at 458.
78. Levine addresses the "like-kind" issue abstractly in a single sentence at the beginning of
his letter. See Levine, supra note 8, at 455. However, when he discusses the effect of disregard-
ing multi-member series entities, he only discusses documentary efficiencies that would result
and omits any mention of positive tax consequences.
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If multi-member series entities could be disregarded, then master
LLCs could offset profits and losses among multiple partnerships, en-
abling a hedging effect that would probably influence investment
strategies and objectives. Perhaps more importantly, disregarded
multi-member series entities could open a Pandora's box of (not so)
"like-kind" exchanges with a potentially infinite number of members
and disregarded partnerships. 79 Would this lead to the "abolition of
the tax system," as one practitioner posits?80 This author suggests that
well-crafted safe harbors with provisions for enterprise value, com-
monality of ownership, marketing and representations to the public,
and other factors could prevent abuse, set standards for best practices,
and enable series LLCs to achieve new heights of innovation.
In any case, the IRS has not yet indicated that it will deviate from
the current practice of taxing multi-member business entities as corpo-
rations or partnerships. Until such a time, a series LLC wishing to
benefit from the tax advantages offered by disregarded entities should
be structured as the sole member of its series entities. Although the
master LLC will be the "owner" of the series entities, members of the
master LLC can achieve the effect of direct interests in series entities
through allocations in the master LLC's operating agreement. 81
C. Structuring Members' Interests in Series LLCs
In general, allocations of LLC membership interests can be flexible,
as long as they have substantial economic effect. 82 In simple terms,
that means "allocations must be based on real economic factors ...
they can't simply be used to shift income around to reduce an owner's
income taxes."'83 Often, "suspect tax allocations" emerge where "an
item of income or loss in one section of the [agreement receives differ-
ent] treatment.., elsewhere in the agreement."'84 Allocations that are
disproportionate are called special allocations85 and are permissible if
the company adopts and implements safe harbor provisions in its op-
79. However, if there is a high degree of common ownership, some of the expansion may be
limited.
80. See Cuff, supra note 41, at 343.
81. CCH TAX LAW, supra note 65, at § 3.19-3.20.
82. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (2006).
83. ANTHONY MANCUSO, NOLO'S QUICK LLC 99 (4th ed. 2007).
84. Allen B. Ellentuck, The CPA's Role in Reviewing LLC Allocations, AM. INST. CPAs (Oct.
1, 2007), http:/www.aicpa.org/Publications/TaxAdviser/2007/oct/Pages/TheCPASRoleinReview-
ingLLCAllocations.aspx. When different sections of an operating agreement conflict,
"[g]enerally, the contribution and distribution provisions of an agreement are deemed to control
the profit and loss allocation provisions." Id.
85. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704.1-1.704.3 (as amended in 2008).
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erating agreement.86 If a company does not meet the safe harbor pro-
visions and the special allocation does not have substantial economic
effect, the IRS will reallocate the partners' interests in the LLC
"based on the underlying economic relationships of the partners, [in-
cluding] the partner's contributions to the partnership, the partner's
interests in the partnership's economic profits and losses, and the part-
ner's rights to operating and liquidating distributions. '87
There is no requirement for a member to be allocated a "share of
all profits in the partnership or [to] have a direct profit interest in
every element of a partnership's activities. ' 88 However, "special allo-
cations [are] frequently.., found within a single partnership," and the
outer boundaries or "limits on tax planners' ability to effect such
schedular allocations within a single tax partnership are not well-de-
fined."' 89 Revenue Ruling 55-39 provides insight at the extreme end of
the spectrum, stating that property held by an entity on behalf of a
partner who retains "all of the incidents of ownership, including the
right to be credited with income and profits therefrom and all rights of
control ...cannot qualify as jointly owned property." 90 Thus, the
86. See Kirk 0. Broberg, Partnership: Understanding the Requirements of Special Allocations,
ADVOCATE, Sept. 1996, at 16, 17. There are three basic safe harbor provisions:
(1) the partnership must determine and maintain proper "capital accounts";
(2) upon liquidation of the partnership or a partner's interest, liquidating distributions
must be made in accordance with the positive capital account balances of the partners;
and
(3) if any partner has a deficit balance in his or her capital account following the liqui-
dation of the partnership or the liquidation of that partner's interest, the partner is
unconditionally obligated to restore to the partnership an amount equal to the deficit
balance in that partner's capital account.
Id. Because (3) would have the effect of negating members' limited liability, an alternate provi-
sion states that:
special allocations will have economic effect if, in addition to satisfying the first two
requirements for economic effect mentioned above, the partnership agreement prohib-
its any allocations or distributions from being made that would cause a deficit in a
partner's capital account balance, or would cause a deficit greater than the amount the
partner has agreed to restore upon liquidation.
Id.
87. Id. at 18; see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-22-014 (Feb. 27, 1996) (noting the 11th Circuit's
holding that a withdrawing partner constructively received a cash distribution because a lender
entered into a "hold harmless" agreement with an LLC's purchasing partner, effectively termi-
nating the withdrawing partner's liability without expressly releasing the partner from her per-
sonal guarantee).
88. See Levine, supra note 8, at 458 (citing Thomas M. Stephens & Marc L. Schultz, Segregat-
ing Assets Within a Single Partnership, TAXES, Mar. 2000, at 231, 240) (unequal distribution of
membership allocations "should not be determinative as to whether the income is partnership
income").
89. See Cuff, supra note 41, at 347.
90. Rev. Rul. 55-39, 1955-1 C.B. 403. This conforms to the substance-over-form approach,
whereby "tax ownership of an asset generally is determined by reference to the locus of risk of
2010] FROM THE OFFSHORE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 15
partner was deemed to be the tax owner of the property. 91 But what if
the partner had only retained ninety-nine percent? At first glance,
one percent might seem to be a mere peppercorn,92 but what if the
series holds high-end real estate valued at $10 million? Clearly, a one-
size-fits-all approach to this issue would be misguided.
Even amid the uncertainty surrounding series LLC taxation, some
practitioners are cautious about achieving too much clarity. In Le-
vine's open letter to the IRS, he implores the IRS for guidance, but
states that "it would [not] be appropriate (or supportable) for a pub-
lished ruling to provide an absolute litmus test as to a particular re-
quired percentage of majority common ownership, except, perhaps, in
the context of a safe harbor which would not be exclusive."'93 In slight
contrast, this author suggests that safe harbor provisions could achieve
a reasonable solution, setting limits on multi-member series entities
and limiting individual members' majority interest in series entities. A
fairly clear litmus test would arguably be advantageous, providing
more certainty and enabling informed decision-making and structur-
ing. But to avoid the peppercorn problem of arbitrary percentages
that do not reflect the underlying value of members' interests, these
models of guidance should be scaled to the series entities' enterprise
value and the value of the members' interests.
IV. STRUCTURING SERIES LLCs FOR ASSET
PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY
The series LLC was developed, in part, to isolate and protect assets
in separate series entities, adapting the current practice whereby "[at-
torneys] advise clients to form multiple LLCs, placing a single asset in
each LLC."'94 To date, there are no published cases indicating how
loss and opportunity for gain with respect to the asset." Edward D. Kleinbard et al., Everything
I Know About New Financial Products I Learned from DECS, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE
TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 741, 759 (2007), available at 791
PLI/Tax 741, 759 (Westlaw) (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (eco-
nomic substance controls the determination of tax ownership of property)); see Rev. Rul. 83-47,
1983-1 C.B. 63 (economic substance analysis requires an examination of which party bears the
risk of loss and opportunity for profit on property).
91. Id.
92. See In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538, 541 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) ("To the extent a debtor
intends to hinder, delay or defraud creditors through a multi-member LLC with 'peppercorn' co-
members, bankruptcy avoidance provisions and fraudulent transfer law would provide creditors
or a bankruptcy trustee with recourse.") (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b)(1) and 548(a) (2006)).
While there is no fraudulent transfer issue in the 1% ownership discussed above, the image of
the peppercorn is a helpful metaphor to illustrate the use of the most minimal arrangement
necessary to circumvent the "letter of the law."
93. See Levine, supra note 8, at 459.
94. See Stein, supra note 12, at 20.
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this structure will perform in jurisdictions without series LLC statutes.
Yet even without such guidance, some commentators are optimistic
about its promise for "small and medium-sized businesses ... such as
organic farms, restaurants, and software and bio-tech start-ups ...
sometimes owned and operated by less-sophisticated investors [who]
might benefit from using the [sleries LLC form. '95
With a more cautious approach, Part IV discusses the doctrine of
substantial consolidation and the unique threat it poses to series
LLCs. The next section addresses the use of series LLCs to hold real
estate, and the bankruptcy ramifications of being declared a SARE.
We then explore strategies that series LLCs may use to avoid SARE
status. Throughout the discussion, these issues are explored in the
context of the businesses noted above - technology companies, farms,
restaurants, and other businesses - illustrating the challenges that face
small to medium-sized companies wishing to organize as series LLCs.
A. Series LLCs and the Threat of Substantive Consolidation
Equitable or substantive consolidation is a legal theory 96 whereby a
bankruptcy court may satisfy the debts of interrelated entities by
treating them as a single entity.97 This is an alternative theory that
may achieve a result similar to "alter ego" and other "veil-piercing"
theories,98 which "the Delaware [series LLC] statute specifically pro-
hibits."99 The modern or liberal trend of consolidation "arises from
... increased judicial recognition of the widespread use of interrelated
corporate structures by subsidiary corporations operating under a par-
ent entity's corporate umbrella for tax and business planning pur-
95. See Gattuso, supra note 9, at 36 (emphasis added).
96. See generally J. Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano & the Death of Substantive Consolida-
tion, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427 (2000). Federal courts began to departed from state "alter
ego" theories in 1964, "and invented a federal common law of substantive consolidation." Id. at
432.
97. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1123
(2006).
98. The corporate veil doctrine is based upon the legal fiction whereby a company is recog-
nized as a juridical person distinct from its individual constituents. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corpora-
tions § 1 (2010). On this fictional premise, "the corporation, not the people who run it or invest
in it, is liable for its contracts and torts." Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Introduction to the Metaphors
of Corporate Law, 4 SEATTLE J. Soc. JusT. 273, 290 (2005). Piercing the corporate veil has
become "the most litigated issue in corporate law." Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Robert Burnett,
Piercing the Corporate Veil in Florida: Defining Improper Conduct, 21 NOVA L. REV. 663, 665
(1997) (citing Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1036 (1991)).
99. See Stein, supra note 12, at text following n.29.
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poses."'1 As such, a series LLC may be a prime target for
consolidation.
The LLC statutes of most states hold that the internal affairs and
liability of foreign LLC members will be governed by the law of the
state where the LLC is organized. 101 Similarly, "the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires states to respect trans-
actions governed by the law of another state, but not if such law is
against the state's public policy.' 10 2 Yet this is cold comfort because
"[a]llowing a defaulting debtor to thumb his or her nose at creditors
while holding protected assets is offensive to most disinterested ob-
servers"10 3 and may run afoul of state policy. More significantly, how-
ever, "bankruptcy courts are not bound by state law or by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.' 104
Initially, a "court may be inclined to presume rebuttably that a [se-
ries entity] is a separate [and distinct entity with limited liability]. "105
However, a court presented with evidence that "ostensibly separate
affiliates have been operated as a single entity" may "create a single
pool of assets and a single body of creditors."'01 6 First, the court will
apply a balancing test to determine whether the benefits of substan-
tive consolidation in a particular case will outweigh the harm that
might result, utilizing a three-part test:
(1) whether a court should treat the corporation and its counter-
parts as a single enterprise because the entities blurred their corpo-
rate forms;
(2) whether substantive consolidation will remedy the harm caused
by the corporation's disregard of corporate separateness for the
benefit of the entire creditor body; and
(3) what impact will substantive consolidation have on creditors
who relied on the entities' corporate separateness when deciding
whether to provide capital.'0 7
100. In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
101. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-901(a)(1); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/45-1(a).
102. See CCH TAX LAW, supra note 65, at § 3.18.
103. Lin Hanson, Don't Use an LLC for Asset Protection, 96 ILL. B.J. 314 (2008). This author
suggests that adequate solutions may be found in the law and in bankruptcy courts.
104. CCH TAX LAW, supra note 65, at § 3.18; see also Stein, supra note 12, at 20 ("[A] bank-
ruptcy court would not be bound by the Delaware series LLC statute and could order substan-
tive consolidation.").
105. 15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ch. TX13, at n.1 (16th ed. 2010).
106. Id.
107. Dennis J. Connolly, John C. Weitnauer & Jonathan T. Edwards, Current Approaches to
Substantive Consolidation: Owens Corning Revisited, 2009 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. pt. I § 9, at
II.C. There are three main versions of this test, the Auto-Train test (D.C. Cir.), the Augie Re-
stivo Test (2d Cir.), and the Eastgroup Test (11th Cir.). See generally Richard D. Jones & Rich-
ard A. Bendit, Practical Advice on the Preparation of the Substantive Non-Consolidation Opinion
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After finding that consolidation will, on balance, effect greater good
than harm, the court will analyze a host of case-specific facts. Under-
capitalization and commingling of assets might be the most classic,
weighted factors in a court's analysis. 108 Yet these factors may not
weigh equally on ordinary LLCs and series LLCs. Series LLC statutes
require that all "liabilities are compartmentalized between series" in
their organizing documents, and further require that assets must be
held and accounted for by each series separately.10 9 Because this is a
condition for the LLC's limited liability, any commingling "might be
interpreted as automatically causing the loss of liability protection.' 10
In this regard, the series LLC has a greater risk profile than regular
LLCs because "a single instance of commingling is merely a factor in
piercing the veil of a regular LLC and would not automatically cause
the assets of one LLC to be subject to the liabilities of a separate,
affiliated LLC."'l' The same instance of commingling might be fatal,
however, to the limited liability of a series LLC.
Yet even if a series LLC properly segregates its assets, it may still
face substantive consolidation. Other factors relevant to series LLCs
include:
reliance by creditors on the credit of the whole group, reporting op-
erations on consolidated financial statements... loan guarantees or
other financing between the two entities, transfer of assets without
observing transactional formalities, common members, common
managers, managers of one entity not acting independently but tak-
ing orders from another entity, one entity paying for expenses of the
other entity, and one entity referring to the other as a department
or division. 112
One commentator asks whether "the use of a series LLC itself [would
be] a factor in showing substantive consolidation.' 13 This is a legiti-
mate question, given that modern substantive consolidation theory
has grown from judges' concern about the increasing use of complex,
asset-protection based business structures that may supplant equity.' 14
In all likelihood, a court might be more apt to discriminate against a
in Real Estate Transactions, in COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION FOR REAL ESTATE LAWYERS 477,
482 (2008), available at SN081 ALI-ABA 477 (Westlaw).
108. See, e.g., In re Bldgs. by Jamie, Inc., 230 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1998).
109. See Cuff, supra note 41, at 344 (citing Delaware LLC Act Section 18-215(b)).
110. CCH TAX LAW, supra note 65, at § 3.17. See Cuff, supra note 41, at 345 ("It is not clear
what happens if a particular asset is used in connection with the business activities of two or
more series. This might be a problem where the activities of several series are conducted from a
single premises.") (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6 § 18-215(b)).
111. CCH TAx LAW, supra note 65, at § 3.17 (emphasis added).
112. See Marsico, supra note 33, at 54-55.
113. Id. at 55.
114. See In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
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series LLC on the basis of its status as a series LLC where creditors
lacked sufficient notice of the entities' status as a separate series entity
with limited liability. Thus, series LLCs in Illinois might be better
protected than those of other states due to the additional name and
registration requirements for series entities. Series LLCs organized in
other jurisdictions might be well advised to implement the name and
registration procedures utilized in Illinois to reduce the plausibility of
a creditor's claim that it lacked notice of the debtor's series entity
status.
The danger of substantive consolidation vis-A-vis the structure of
company assets and management can be illustrated with the example
of a start-up biotechnology company organized as a series LLC. In an
ideal scenario, the series LLC members or managers will possess the
business skills and knowledge needed to keep separate financials for
each entity and to segregate assets and liabilities, as required by stat-
ute. Instead of operating a purely research and development-oriented
business model, the company might consider the revenue-funded com-
pany model, utilizing series entities to produce revenue streams from
outside of the series LLC through research services, "technology flip-
ping," or manufacturing biological materials. 115 For example, equip-
ment and materials costing less than $10,000 could be placed into a
series entity in order to manufacture and sell high value nuclear ex-
tracts (proteins removed from cell nuclei). 1 16 The biggest expense in
this scenario is the cost of the researchers' long hours, yet because
researchers in a start-up biotech company are often equity-holders,
the operating agreement should be carefully crafted to reflect propor-
tionate interests in both the specific series entity and in the series LLC
as a whole. At the theoretical level, then, small start-up biotech com-
panies could utilize series LLCs successfully.
Yet many start-up technology companies have limited resources,
"often start[ing] in a garage atmosphere funded by founders, family,
and friends. 11 7 Thus, it is highly likely that the average technology
start-up will be limited in its research facilities, equipment, and other
assets. Yet series LLC statutes require that the assets of various series
entities be held separately. The degree to which series entities may
115. EILEEN SMITH EWING ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 75 (2007).
116. Interview with Juanita Matthews, Ph.D. in Bio-Molecular Engineering, University of Ha-
waii (2010) (notes on file with author).
117. Bente Hansen, Tooling Up: The Start-Up Environment: Is It for You?, SCIENCE (Mar. 3,
2000), http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career-magazine/previous-issues/articles/2000-03
03/noDOI.5140451859548215316 (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
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utilize other entities' assets is still undefined;118 however, a court ana-
lyzing a scenario where series entities share the same operational fa-
cility, equipment, and resources will likely find that the entities
comingled assets and forfeited limited liability. Additional financial
factors, such as whether the entities shared a cash management sys-
tem 1 9 may, in total, incline a court to apply substantial consolidation.
Another important factor to consider relates to the fact that tech-
nology start-ups are "usually informally organized with only one level
of management and few employees.' 120 The informal nature of these
start-ups is directly at odds with the level of strict organization, com-
partmentalization, and bookkeeping that is required to maintain lim-
ited liability for a series LLC. A small start-up divided into series
entities will likely involve common ownership, management, and
workforce, providing support for the application of substantial consol-
idation. Further, if the series entities are not designed with outside
revenue streams and only conduct business with the master LLC,'121
there is probably a greater chance of consolidation. Thus, multiple
sources of revenue, reasonably separate assets and management, and
a portfolio of diverse business purposes amongst the entities appears
to be the golden rule for structuring series LLCs. However, such a
portfolio of diverse businesses may be out of reach for most small and
medium-sized companies.
B. Single Asset Real Estate Companies in Bankruptcy
Holding real estate is regarded as "[t]he quintessential use of the
series LLC."'1 22 Many practitioners advocate the series LLC structure
to segregate real estate parcels and/or on-site businesses into separate
series entities, shielding each property or business from liabilities aris-
ing from the others. 123 Although such arrangements will save some
start-up expenses, it remains an almost un-noteworthy shift from the
ongoing practice of isolating separate properties and businesses in dif-
118. CCH TAX LAW, supra note 65, at § 3.17. See Cuff, supra note 41, at 345 ("It is not clear
what happens if a particular asset is used in connection with the business activities of two or
more series. This might be a problem where the activities of several series are conducted from a
single premises.") (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6 § 18-215(b)).
119. See, e.g., In re Lionel L.L.C., No. 04-17324, 2008 WL 905928, at *11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2008).
120. Susan Standing et al., A Framework for Managing Knowledge in Strategic Alliances in the
Biotechnology Sector, 25 Sys. RES. & BEHAV. ScI. 783, 785 (2008), available at http://www.access
mylibrary.com/coms2/summary-0286-36701821-ITM (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
121. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (1st Cir. 1983) (quot-
ing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940)).
122. See Marsico, supra note 33, at 50.
123. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 46.
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ferent LLCs. Unfortunately, using the series LLC in a parallel fashion
makes such entities vulnerable to significant disadvantages in bank-
ruptcy, because each LLC or series entity holding only real estate may
be considered a SARE.
The first major disadvantage of SAREs in bankruptcy is that
"courts often dismiss filings by such entities based on bad faith," even
though "such cases are not bad-faith filings per se."'1 24 Courts look to
a number of factors in determining whether to dismiss a SARE bank-
ruptcy, including whether:
(1) the debtor has only one asset (the property);
(2) the debtor has relatively few unsecured creditors whose claims
are small compared to those of secured creditors;
(3) the debtor has few employees;
(4) the property is the subject of a pending foreclosure and prima-
rily involves a dispute between the debtor and its secured credi-
tor(s); and
(5) the debtor's filing was timed to frustrate the legitimate rights
and remedies of the secured creditor(s). 125
This disadvantage is more severe if the primary creditor(s) can buy
the claims of small unsecured creditors for greater leverage.126
The second major disadvantage of SAREs in bankruptcy is that
SAREs get only ninety days to submit a reorganization plan - twenty-
five percent less time than allowed for a non-SARE. 127 If the SARE
does not submit a plan with a "reasonable possibility of confirmation"
within that time, it must make monthly payments to secured creditors
at the applicable non-default rate of interest. 128 If it fails to do so, the
SARE will be "subject to foreclosure proceedings by their secured
creditors after they obtain relief from the automatic stay."'1 29
This is unpleasant news in the wake of the global economic down-
turn precipitated by the sub-prime mortgage crisis, where U.S. home
prices quickly fell by nineteen percent, 130 commercial real estate hit
124. John C. Murray, Observations on Some of the Provisions Affecting Real Estate, PROB. &
PROP., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 42, 43-44.
125. Id. (citing In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 1988). See In re
State St. Houses, Inc., 356 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court's use of Piccadilly
factors). See also Robert N. H. Christmas, Eleventh Circuit Decision Reaffirms Bad-faith Prece-
dent in Single-asset Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2005, at 32, 33.
126. See In re Fighter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 996 (1997).
127. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2006), with 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006).
129. Marcia L. Goldstein & John W. Lucas, Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcy & Recent
Developments, in ABI NEW YORK Crry BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE 107, 109 (2008), available at
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/realestate/vol5num3/Real-Estate-July-2008-
HotTopicsSingleAsset.pdf.
130. Jia Lynn Yang, Gang Green, FORTUNE, Apr. 27, 2009, at 12, 12.
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record levels of twenty-five percent vacancy in some cities,131 and
where auctioneers handled twice the number of distressed property
cases of the previous year in the first four months of 2009.132 "In the
usual SARE case, the debtor... [has] an apartment or office building
that cannot generate sufficient rental income for the debt service on
the mortgage" as a result of "a general decline in the real estate mar-
ket that []results in a property value . . . lower than the mortgage
debt."' 33 Amid these conditions, poorly capitalized SAREs may be
tremendously disadvantaged, because they have less time to propose a
reorganization plan at a time when the value of real estate is severely
depressed and distorted. Further, a SARE may find itself making
monthly payments to prevent foreclosure on a vacant property gener-
ating no revenue.
Large enterprises structured as a multitude of SAREs face com-
pounded problems and greater exposure to systemic risk. 34 If an en-
terprise holds numerous insolvent SAREs, it will face significant
expenses to reorganize each entity. Generally, a company can secure
pre-bankruptcy financing to cover the expenses it will face, but inter-
est rates may be fifteen percent and are often loaded with hidden fees
along the way.135 If the company, its constituent SAREs, and its cred-
itors have convoluted relationships that are too complex and un-
wieldy, a court may apply equitable or substantive consolidation,
destroying a company's asset protection scheme. 136
131. Zach Fox, Regulators Probe Commercial Loans for Next Meltdown: Local Banker Sees
Longer Audits, Conflicting Directives, N. COUNTY TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
7705059 (Westlaw).
132. Casey Ross, Commercial Properties Fall to Foreclosure: Crisis Can Sow Blight, Cut into
Local Tax Bases, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 7562596 (Westlaw).
133. Single Asset Bankruptcy Cases: Drawing the Line Between Operating the Property & Op-
erating a Substantial Business, BANKR. L. LETrER, Feb. 2008, at 1, 1.
134. Systemic risk relates to the possibility of a financial system failure that may result
through "a series of correlated defaults among financial institutions - typically banks - that
occur over a short period of time, often caused by a single major event." Jonathan Sokobin,
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Speech at the APEC Financial Regulators'
Training Initiative: Hedge Funds: What Scares Regulators and What Can We Do About it?
(Mar. 30, 2007).
135. Ted Petit, Seminar Panelist: Survive and Thrive in the Downturn, Honolulu Hawaii (Jan.
29, 2009) (notes on file with author).
136. See Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966) (equitable
consolidation is appropriate where "interrelationships of the group are hopelessly obscured and
the time and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them so substantial as to threaten
the realization of any net assets for all the creditors"); see also Jordan A. Kroop, Baseball and the
"Abecedarian Prerequisite" to Substantive Consolidation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.-Jan. 2001, at
22, 22 (substantive consolidation may be used to "avoid the unwieldy (or impossible) task of
figuring out which entity owns what, and who owns what to whom"). Courts have also acknowl-
edged that consolidation should be "used sparingly[,]" because the various entities "are likely to
have different debt-to-asset ratios, consolidation 'almost invariably redistributes wealth among
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C. SARE-Resistant Solutions and Asset Protection Structures
for Series LLCs
A series LLC with many series entities holding individual properties
might logically anticipate that it can easily merge two series entities
that hold real estate in order to avoid SARE status. Further, one
would expect that a Delaware Series LLC could quickly deploy this
merger on its books, a simple solution requiring no documentation
with the state. Unfortunately, this solution will not hold, as the U.S.
bankruptcy code's notion of SAREs is not so singular.
Even enterprises holding multiple properties and on-site operations
are at risk of being declared a SARE in a bankruptcy proceeding.
SARE provisions in the Bankruptcy Code have been amended several
times, and earlier versions of the code defined SAREs with an enter-
prise value ceiling of four million dollars - above that and the com-
pany would not be deemed a SARE. 137 The Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005138 eliminated the
enterprise value ceiling for SAREs, and the definition of SARE now
broadly includes all properties deemed to be a "single project" when a
group of properties have a related connection or purpose in a "com-
mon plan or scheme involving their use. '139 The enterprise will be
considered a SARE if: (1) the debtor has real property constituting a
single property or project (other than residential real property with
fewer than four residential units); (2) such real property generates
substantially all of the gross income of the debtor; and (3) there is no
substantial business conducted on the real property other than the
business of operating the real property and activities incidental
thereto. 140 This definition is inclusive of (but not limited to) apart-
ment buildings, office buildings, and strip-mall shopping centers
the creditors of the various entities."' Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245,
248 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Cont'l Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1001 (2nd Cir.
1975), and In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276) (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
137. See Randy P. Orlik & Susan S. Davis, Single-Asset Real Estate - Congress' Gift to the
Secured Creditor, ANDREWS BANKR. LII G. Rzrp., May 30, 2008, at text accompanying n.2, availa-
ble at 5 No. 2 ANBKRLR 2 (Westlaw) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (1994), amended by Pub. L.
109-8, § 12041(5)(B) (previously defining a SARE as "[R]eal property constituting a single prop-
erty or project, other than residential real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which
generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on
which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other than the business of operat-
ing the real property and activities incidental . . . [with] aggregate noncontingent, liquidated
secured debts" not exceeding four million dollars.)).
138. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1502
(2006).
139. In re McGreals, 201 B.R. 736, 741 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2006); see also In re Scotia Pac. Co., 508 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir.
2007); In re Kara Homes, Inc., 363 B.R. 399, 406 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
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owned by an entity whose sole purpose is to generate income through
the operation of the property and incidental activities relating to the
property. 141
Even large scale enterprises can be found to be a "single project."
A property development company that built homes and condomini-
ums and directly marketed its homes to the public was held to be an
SARE in In re Kara Homes, Inc. 142 The court held that the company's
revenues would not have been generated but for the eventual sale of
the real estate, and thus, the building activity and marketing were in-
trinsic and incidental to operating or developing the property.143
However, cases like In re Whispering Pines Estate, Inc. provide that
some businesses conduct activities that are sufficiently distinct from
the incidental operation of the property (hotels, for example) and
these operational activities preclude SARE status.144 Similarly, most
country clubs would probably not be SAREs, because they have mul-
tiple revenue-generating activities, including membership sales, golf
course fees, golf cart rentals, tennis court fees, food and alcohol sales
at country club restaurants, merchandise sales at golf pro shops, and
space rental for special events. 145
The hotel and country club cases provide two important insights.
First, a company may avoid SARE status with diversified business ac-
tivities that generate revenues distinct from the management of the
property. Second, many small and medium-sized companies may not
have the economies of scale or resources to "tranche" their operations
with diverse revenue streams; some of them will only have revenue
incidental to operating properties, and thus, it may be more difficult to
structure SARE-resistant solutions for them. Yet, a recent case, In re
Scotia Dev., LLC,146 provides hope that some businesses may be able
to escape SARE classification through smaller-scale business activities
on the property.
In re Scotia Dev., LLC involved a company holding rights to harvest
and sell 200,000 acres of timberland. 47 While the court did spend
141. In re Syed, 238 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1999); see also In re KKEMKO, 181 Bankr. 47,
50 (holding that apartment buildings may constitute an SARE).
142. In re Kara Homes, Inc., 363 B.R. 399, 406 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
143. Id.
144. 341 B.R. 134, 136 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006); see also In re CBJ Devel., Inc., 202 B.R. 467,472
n.7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (a hotel may be an SARE depending on services provided and the
number of people it employs).
145. In re Club Golf Partners, L.P., No. 07-40096, 2007 WL 1176010, at *6 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
146. In re Scotia Dev., LLC, 375 B.R. 764 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007), affd, 508 F.3d 214 (5th Cir.
2007).
147. Id. at 766.
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time addressing the size of the enterprise and its numerous employees,
perhaps the most significant portion of the judgment held, "[w]here a
debtor is actively using property in its operations any revenue gener-
ated is attributable to the operation and not the property." 148 This
case confirms the possibility that farmers organized as series LLCs
(and otherwise following all proper procedures and formalities) could
successfully avoid SARE status. Series entities could be used to seg-
regate farm real estate from some operational aspects of the farm for
asset protection purposes. However, to guard against SARE status
risk in bankruptcy, it may be advisable to leave some of the revenue-
generating operations of the farm unsevered from the segregated real
estate parcels. A farmer might also have to invest in additional (po-
tentially duplicate) equipment for use with the different series entities.
Cuff provides an example where a farmer with very large holdings
organizes into multiple entities, 149 and the principle behind In re Sco-
tia Dev., LLC would seem to hold for farmers on a smaller enterprise
value scale, too, to the extent of their ability to invest capital, re-
sources, and management into separate entities.
Restaurants are similarly unlikely SARE candidates when the com-
pany owns the real estate and the operational arm of the restaurant.
Arguably, there is only one main revenue-generating activity - pro-
viding food and service to customers - an activity that is not oriented
around the sale or lease of property or incidental activities relating to
the sale or lease of land. In re Scotia Dev., LLC provides support for
such an argument, holding that "a debtor is not a single asset real
estate debtor where ... revenue is the product of the efforts of man-
agement and workers conducted on the lands, bringing in the custom-
ers and selling services and goods to them."'' 50 For this reason, a
restaurant may be structured with some of its operations paired with
the real estate to prevent SARE risk. But some restaurants might still
be able to segregate operations. If the restaurant provides off-site ca-
tering services, for example, catering and on-site restaurant operations
could be segregated in separate series entities and paired with real
property as desired.
148. Id. at 776 (citing In re Club Golf Partners, L.P., No. 07-40096, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1225
(Bankr. E.D. Tex., Feb. 15, 2007)); In re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski Club, Inc., 255 B.R. 228, 229
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2000) (attributing the debtor's income to various enterprises occurring on the
debtor's property); In re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc., 219 B.R. 391, 392 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997);
In re Majestic Motel Assocs., 131 B.R. 523 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
149. See Cuff, supra note 41, at 348-49.
150. In re Scotia Dev., LLC, 375 B.R. 764, 776 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (citing In re Club Golf
Partners, L.P., No. 07-40096, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1225 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Feb 15, 2007).
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Restaurants that wish to segregate certain operations, such as ca-
tering, from the main operation of the restaurant face similar chal-
lenges as those discussed in relation to start-up technology companies.
Restaurants will be naturally inclined to use the same systems and
resources for both on-site operations and off-site catering operations.
However, to create a secure series entity that has less risk of substan-
tive consolidation, the segregated operations should use separate
point-of-sale systems, have separate employment agreements with ca-
tering company employees, differentiate the brand names and promo-
tional materials of the two services, and avoid comingling property.
Some of my clients have even built an additional kitchen onto their
restaurants to address this kind of issue and to accommodate the
growth of their catering businesses. Clearly, a restaurant must make a
significant investment to establish independent, segregated series enti-
ties that that will stand up in court.
While some businesses such as hotels, country clubs, farms, and
even restaurants often have sufficient resources to tranche operations
and property effectively, they also have a specific SARE-resistant ad-
vantage under In re Scotia Dev., LLC, because the nature of these
businesses involves the sale of goods and services. But what kind of
solutions are available for businesses with real estate holdings that do
not produce revenue by goods and services, but merely through inci-
dental operation of the property? For most small and medium-sized
businesses, a fully satisfactory solution may be out of reach, because
these business will generally lack the capital, assets, workforce, and
management required to organize a master series LLC with diverse
business activities segregated into functioning series entities.
Larger organizations, on the other hand, are in a much better posi-
tion to extract and restructure business operations, especially fre-
quently outsourced services. For example, billing and collection
services that are handled separately by each series entity could be con-
solidated into a new series entity. Similar arrangements could be
made with property management and maintenance activities, market-
ing activities, equipment rental and maintenance, insurance brokering,
or purchase management for commodities, energy, or other utilities.
To protect the series entity and the series LLC from the potential risk
of equitable consolidation, however, a service-oriented series entity
should seek revenue streams outside of the series LLC and hold itself
out to the public as open for business.
By effectively "tranching" various operations, a company may com-
bine them with real estate or keep them separate to meet its desired
operational, capital, and risk structure objectives in a portfolio of se-
[Vol. 9:1
2010] FROM THE OFFSHORE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 27
ries entities. Members of the series LLC can structure their master
LLC allocations with varying interests in the network of series enti-
ties, allowing investors to achieve an individually structured risk and
investment profile within the company.
In addition to isolating risk and generating independent streams of
income, the segregated service and goods companies are also valuable
as potential merger candidates when series entities holding real estate
face solvency problems. A merger would have no tax impact on the
master LLC because both entities (if properly formed) can elect to be
disregarded under the Check the Box Regulations.151 Prior to the
merger, the two entities may have varying profit and loss allocations
designated to different master LLC members, and the merger will re-
quire an amendment to the operating agreement, which can be
achieved without the recognition of tax gain or loss. 152 Yet series
LLCs should take extra care to ensure proper execution and to ensure
that the transaction does not constitute a fraudulent transfer, 153 which,
among other things, requires arms-length transactions at a fair value.
Such transactions may require additional injections of capital, perhaps
from other series LLC members or from new investors. The series
LLC is perfectly designed to allow a new investor to step in and revi-
talize an insolvent company. The new investor makes a contribution
and can receive an allocation to a percentage of profits from one or
more existing series entities, or form a new series entity created and
merged with other series entities.
Clearly, the series LLC potentiates many innovative solutions for
risk structuring, asset protection, business reorganization, and organic
business growth. The biggest challenge is that a company cannot take
shortcuts when using this vehicle - otherwise, it risks forfeiting every-
thing it attempted to structure. Smaller companies often lack the cap-
ital, assets, and management necessary to operate a network of series
entities that can withstand substantive consolidation and/or SARE
status in bankruptcy. Larger enterprises, however, may implement
economies of scale and management that truly unlock the series
LLC's potential as a business and investment vehicle.
151. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
152. See Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157. Conversions of interests in the same partnership
are not affected. Section 1031(a)(2)(D). See Joint Committee On Taxation, General Explana-
tion of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act 1984, 98th Cong. 246 (1984), availa-
ble at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2376.
153. But special care should be taken that the transaction would not constitute an avoidable,
fraudulent transfer. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 550 (2006).
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V. CONCLUSION
The series LLC is not a panacea structure that will work for all busi-
ness enterprises. Enthusiastic calls to "roll out" the series LLC for
small and medium-sized businesses are not only "premature"; 154 they
may also be imprudent. Indeed, even the quintessential use of series
LLCs - holding real estate in segregated entities - appears to suffer
from tremendous downside risk and bankruptcy disadvantages. The
lack of adequate assets, management, and workforce is also a major
impediment to structuring effective series LLCs for small businesses.
Further, the series LLC's strict statutory requirements on segregating
assets and liabilities may be a trap for unsophisticated members, who
may blunder and destroy the series LLC's limited liability.
Larger, more sophisticated operations, on the other hand, could
utilize this vehicle effectively, taking instruction from Private Letter
Ruling 20-08-030-04155 and growing diverse business operations or-
ganically in series entities that are segregated or paired with real es-
tate to meet a company's desired operational, capital, and risk
structure objectives. Additional developments in tax and bankruptcy
law could heighten the series LLC's performance as an advantaged
vehicle for investment and innovation. In the area of tax, safe harbor
provisions could disregard multi-member series entities where com-
mon ownership, enterprise value, and other factors meet specified re-
quirements. In bankruptcy, re-establishing an asset-value ceiling for
SARE status would improve the risk profile for all companies holding
real estate of significant value, especially series LLCs holding proper-
ties in segregated series entities; it would also ease pressure on real
estate markets during periods of volatility and extended economic
downturns.
154. CCH TAX LAW, supra note 65, at § 3.25.
155. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 20-08-030-04 (Jan. 18, 2008).
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